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I. INTRODUCTION
The central premise to the objective theory of contracts is that
contractual assent is determined by analyzing external evidence, and
evidence of subjective, internal intention is therefore unimportant.'
That is, contract formation is concerned with communication, not
cognition Thus, modem objective theory provides that "objective
manifestations of intent of [a] party should generally be viewed from
* © 2008 Wayne Barnes. Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of
Law. J.D., Texas Tech University School of Law; B.B.A., University of North Texas. I would
like to thank Texas Wesleyan University School of Law for its generous research assistance
provided for this Article. I would also like to thank my Texas Wesleyan colleagues for their
input on this Article at an informal works-in-progress presentation on August 26, 2008,
including Paul George, Carla Pratt, Jason Gillmer, Huyen Pham, Michael Green, Susan
Ayres, and Keith Hirokawa.
1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 242 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
Little, Brown & Co. 1963) (1881) ("The law has nothing to do with the actual state of the
parties' minds. In contract, as elsewhere, it must go by externals, and judge parties by their
conduct.").
2. See Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Prhinciple of Pn'vate
Autonomy. Lon Fuller's "Considemtion and Form, "100 COLUM. L. REv. 94, 129-30 (2000)
(describing the history of the development of objective theory).
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the vantage point of a reasonable person in the position of the other
party."3 Most of the jurisdictions of the world follow a basic objective
theory of contract formation.! This nearly universal adherence to
objective theory follows from the obvious pragmatism of the rule;5
however, on a more fundamental level, it also serves many of the
philosophical underpinnings of contract law, such as principles of
fairness and protection of reliance, freedom of contract, and personal
autonomy.'
There appears to be one major nation in the world where the
prevalence of the objective theory is in some question-France.7 For
English-speaking common law scholars, the French position on the
subjective theory of contracts is revealed through the recurrent
repetition of statements like this one from the Calamari and Perillo
hornbook on Contracts: "[T]he subjective theory dominates thinking
about contract [in France]."'8 Or this one: "For a contract to exist in
French law there must be a subjective agreement as to its terms; in
English law an objective agreement suffices."9  Or this one from
Williston's venerable treatise on contracts, otherwise discussing the
prevalence in the common law of the objective theory:
3. JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 2.2, at 27 (5th ed.
2003) (citing Ricketts v. Pa. R.R., 153 E2d 757, 760-61 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J.,
concurring)).
4. See 1 PIERRE BONASSIES ET AL., FORMATION OF CONTRACTS: A STUDY OF THE
COMMON CORE OF LEGAL SYSTEMS 147 (Rudolf B. Schlesinger ed. 1968) ("With the possible
exception of French law, all systems under consideration agree, as a matter of principle, that
communication of acceptance is necessary to bring about a contract."); see also Joseph M.
Perillo, The Onrgins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpretation, 69
FORDHAM L. REv. 427, 428 (2000) (describing common law rejection of the subjective
approach).
5. Perillo, supra note 4, at 428-29. Professor Perillo states that the permanent
dominance of the objective theory in the United States occurred when most jurisdictions
changed the rules of procedure to allow litigants to testify for themselves. Id.
6. See PERILLO, supa note 3, § 1.4, at 6-13.
7. BoNAsstEs ET AL., supm note 4, at 147; see also id. at 113 ("All systems under
consideration, with the possible exception of the French, agree that such undeclared
revocation is ineffective if it does not come to the notice of the offeree."). The Schlesinger
comparative study considered a large number of representative nations, including a number
of communist countries (including the then-existing Soviet Union), England, Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, France, Austria, Germany, Switzerland, India, Italy, Poland, and South
Africa.
8. BONASSIES ET AL., supra note 4, at 1316-19; PERILLO, supra note 3, § 2.2, at 27;
A.G. Chloros, Comparative Aspects of the Intention To Create Legal Relations in Contract,
33 TUL. L. REv. 607, 613-17 (1959).
9. Anne de Moor, Contract and Agreement in English and French Law, 6 OxFoRD J.




It would indeed be possible for a system of contractual law to adopt as a
principle the subjective theory that wherever the parties intended legal
obligation, then, and then only, the law would create one, and such an
idea seems to have developed and to have had considerable acceptance
on the Continent of Europe.' °
Williston was assuredly referring to France and the system of contract
law under the Napoleonic Code-the French Civil Code. Thus, it
seems clear that there is a perception that France espouses a subjective
theory of contracts, which runs quite contrary to the objective theory
that prevails not only in the common law, but in most of the rest of the
world.
The question that this Article raises is, Does the French subjective
theory, while conceptually distinct from the objective theory, produce
significantly different outcomes in actual disputes? While France
would alone be a significant enough world citizen to warrant
consideration of this question, the reality is that the French Civil Code
has been widely adopted and copied in many of the civil law nations
throughout the world." So, it affects a significant portion of the
world's jurisdictions, beyond that of just the sovereign nation of
France. Therefore, this Article will undertake an examination of the
objective theory of contracts, as well as the evidence of the French
subjective theory, and ascertain whether there is a profound difference
in their application and results of legal disputes in the two systems.
Part II will discuss the principles of the objective theory of contracts.
Part III will discuss the French subjective theory of contracts, some of
its distinctive rules, and a comparative analysis of those rules when
compared with Anglo-American objective theory. Part IV will
conclude with the observation that the differences in philosophy
between the two sets of systems at issue, while certainly not irrelevant,
do not result in the exceedingly different outcomes that one might
otherwise initially suspect.
10. SAMUEL WILLISTON & GEORGE J. THOMPSON, SELECTIONS FROM WILLISTON'S
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 21, at 18 (rev. ed. 1938). Williston went on to say that
the subjective theory was "foreign to the common law and, it may be added, is intrinsically
objectionable." Id
11. See MICHAEL H. WHINCUP, CONTRACT LAW AND PRACTICE: THE ENGLISH SYSTEM
AND CONTINENTAL COMPARISONS 33 (4th ed. 2001) ("The basic rules of contract in French
law are in the Civil Code, the great Napoleonic Code of 1804, model of the Codes of
Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Egypt, Louisiana,
Quebec, and the states of South America.").
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II. THE OBJECTIVE THEORY OF CONTRACTS
Contracting is, above all else, a consensual activity.'" Contract
has been defined as a "legally enforceable agreement."'3  The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines agreement as "a
manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two or more persons."'"
The traditional steps for determining whether mutual assent has
occurred are the offer and acceptance.'5 But, the ultimate issue in
contract law is whether the parties have mutually agreed to some
exchange.
There are two planes on which mutual assent can be analyzed-
the objective and the subjective. By objective, we mostly mean the
external communications of assent as perceived by the other party,
whereas subjective assent has little to do with external perceptions, but
rather is concerned with whether the parties each subjectively intended
to make the contract.' 6  Courts and commentators struggled
philosophically throughout the history of the development of contract
doctrine to identify the appropriate manner of determining assent. 7
12. See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269,
296-300 (1986).
13. PERILLO, supra note 3, § 1.1, at 2.
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1981).
15. Id. §§ 17-70.
16. See Newman v. Schiff, 778 E2d 460, 464 (8th Cir. 1985) (citing Ricketts v. Pa.
R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., concurring); MORTON HORWiTZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 180-88 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992)
(1977); Samuel Williston, MutualAssent in the Formation of Contracts, 14 ILL. L. REv. 85, 85
(1919)); see also 2 Derecho general de las obligaciones, in 1 JosE PUIG BRUTAU,
FUNDAMENTOS DE DERECHO CIVIL 92-99 (1959); ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 106, at 156 (1952)) ("It is arguable whether the parties are bound according to
their real will, or according to their will as manifested, in cases where differences are
apparent between what was really intended and what was actually declared. It is easy to
understand that this argument reflects the long-standing dispute between the subjective and
objective approach to contract'"); 6 SAUJL LITVINOFF, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE:
OBLIGATIONS § 135, at 223 (1969) (citing Paul Esmein, 1 Obligations, in 6 MARCEL PLANIOL
& GEORGES RIPERT, TRAITE PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 109 (2d ed. 1952).
17. See Newman, 778 F.2d at 464; Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 760-61 (Frank, J.,
concurring) ("In the early days of this century a struggle went on between the respective
proponents of two theories of contracts, (a) the 'actual intent' theory-or 'meeting of the
minds' or 'will' theory-and (b) the so-called 'objective' theory."); 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.6, at 208 (3d ed. 2004) ("This question provoked one of the
most significant doctrinal struggles in the development of contract law, that between the
subjective and objective theories."); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS
§ 30, at 62 (4th ed. 2001) ("[A] great deal of controversy was spawned over the question of
whether the actual mental assent (subjective) of the parties was required, or whether the
expression or manifestation of that assent (objective) would control regardless of any alleged
subjective intention"); PERILLO, supa note 3, § 2.2, at 26-27 ("A debate has raged as to
whether the assent of the parties should be actual mental assent so that there is a 'meeting of
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The first plane is the subjective approach, or "meeting of the
minds." This approach is concerned with the actual, literal intentions
of the parties.'8  "The subjectivists looked to actual assent. Both
parties had to actually assent to an agreement for there to be a
contract."'9  External manifestations of assent are taken merely as
evidence of the actual intent of the contracting party. ° Proponents of
this subjective theory exalt the freedom of contract above all other
principles-they only wish to bind those who clearly and subjectively
intended themselves to be so bound.'
The second plane is the objective approach. This approach
analyzes the external evidence of the parties' intentions as the only
relevant consideration. Judge Learned Hand memorably described
objective theory as follows:
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or
individual, intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by
the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, which
ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent. If, however, it
the minds' or whether assent should be determined solely from objective manifestations of
intent-namely what a party says and does rather than what a party subjectively intends or
believes or assumes."); Herman Oliphant, The Duration and Termination of an Offer, 18
MICH. L. REV. 201, 201 (1920) ("Professor Williston has recently pointed out the change
which the law of the formation of simple contracts underwent during the first century of its
development. The change is fundamental. Originally the courts thought of a simple contract
as involving an actual concurrence of the minds of the parties. Gradually this conception was
supplanted by the notion that the objective and not the subjective state of mind of the parties
is controlling." (citing Williston, supra note 16, at 85)).
18. See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence.- Default Rules and Contractual
Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 898 (1992) ("A 'will theory' traces the obligatory nature of
contracts to the fact that parties have subjectively chosen to assume an obligation. According
to this conception of consent, when one does not subjectively consent one has not 'really'
consented.").
19. Newman, 778 F.2d at 464 (citing Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 760 (Frank, J., concurring);
HORWITZ, supra note 16, at 180-88; Williston, supra note 16, at 85); see also LITVINOFF, supra
note 16, § 135, at 223-24 ("One classic theory enhances the predominance of the real-the
subjective,-will, and asserts that the declaration or manifestation of it has only a secondary
importance. It is necessary, then, to scrutinize carefully the real will in order to learn whether
the contract was actually formed, and, if that is the case, to interpret it."). As Professor
Farnsworth states in his treatise:
The subjectivists looked to the actual or subjective intentions of the parties. The
subjectivists did not go so far as to advocate that subjective assent alone was
sufficient to make a contract. Even under the subjective theory there had to be
some manifestation of assent. But actual assent to the agreement on the part of
both parties was necessary, and without it there could be no contract. In the much-
abused metaphor, there had to be a "meeting of the minds."
FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, § 3.6, at 208-09.
20. Newman, 778 F.2d at 464.
21. See LnTVNOFF, supra note 16, § 135, at 224.
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were proved by twenty bishops that either party, when he used the
words, intended something else than the usual meaning which the law
imposes upon them, he would still be held, unless there were some
mutual mistake, or something else of the sort.22
Similarly, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. stated that "[t]he law has
nothing to do with the actual state of the parties' minds. In contract, as
elsewhere, it must go by externals, and judge parties by their
conduct.*2 ' Dean Langdell observed that "[iun truth, mental acts or
acts of the will are not the materials out of which promises are made; a
physical act on the part of the promisor is indispensable; and when the
required physical act has been done, only a physical act can undo it. '"24
"The real will of the parties, according to this theory, only exists in
their soul and, therefore, cannot enter the field of the law."25 More
recently, Judge Easterbrook has observed that "'intent' does not invite
a tour through [plaintiff's] cranium, with [plaintiff] as the guide. 26
Ultimately, as demonstrated by the jurisprudential observations
above, in Anglo-American jurisdictions, objective theory became the
dominant method by which mutual assent to contract was
determined.2 Though the common law courts undoubtedly assimilated
22. Hotchkiss v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y 1911). Professor
Allan Farnsworth described Hand's famous quote this way: "Note that Hand, with typical
crusader's zeal, denied not only the necessity of a 'meeting of the minds,' but even its
relevance." E. Allan Farnsworth, 'Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 943
(1967).
23. HOLMES, supra note 1, at 309.
24. C.C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 244 (2d ed. 1880).
25. LITVINOFF, supra note 16, § 135, at 224.
26. Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 E2d 810, 814 (7th Cir. 1987).
27. Newman v. Schiff, 778 E2d 460, 465 (8th Cir. 1985) ("By the end of the
nineteenth century the objective approach to the mutual assent requirement had become
predominant, and courts continue to use it today." (citing E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS§ 3.6, at 114 (1982))); Ricketts v. Pa. R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 761-62 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J.,
concurring) ("At any rate, the sponsors of complete 'objectivity' in contracts largely won out
in the wider generalizations of the Restatement of Contracts and in some judicial
pronouncements." (citing Hotchkiss, 200 F at 293; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 70-71,
503 (1932); 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 35 (rev. ed.
1936)). In his treatise on contract law, Professor Murray states the resolution in favor of
objective theory as follows:
The controversy has been resolved. Contract law abandoned the theory of
subjective intention as unworkable. A legion of cases support the view that the
outward manifestations of the parties--their expressions-will be viewed as the
exclusive evidence of the parties' intentions rather than assertions of their
subjective intention.... There can be no doubt ... that the objective theory is
clearly established throughout the country.
MURRAY, supra note 17, § 30, at 63-64 (citations omitted).
There is some dispute about whether Anglo-American law previously followed a
subjective approach, prior to settling on a predominantly objective approach. Many standard
364
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certain aspects of subjective doctrine, the objective test eventually
prevailed.28 "Objectivity prevailed because the courts, having regard
for the external manifestations of agreement, were obliged to rule on
whether or not an agreement had in fact been made, and ensure that
commercial common sense was not adversely affected by the
operation of a subjective 'will theory."'29 The modern approach to
objective theory has become more flexible by taking into account the
superior knowledge of the person to whom contractual manifestations
are made. This is achieved by a modern definition of objective theory
which states that "[a] party's intention will be held to be what a
reasonable person in the position of the other party would conclude the
manifestation to mean."3 This definition keeps the components of
classical objective theory by analyzing assent from the perspective of
the "reasonable person"" but it improves upon "pure" objective theory
by taking into account some subjectivity and thereby incorporating the
point of view of someone "in the position of" the one receiving the
manifestation.
The objective theory of contracts has been well established in
Anglo-American jurisdictions, and even in most other major
jurisdictions in the world (with the notable exception of France),
because of its logical pragmatism and vindication of many policy-
oriented concerns of contract law. The objective theory deals with
knowable evidence of external manifestations of assent and makes
those the primary basis of concern for determining formation of
contract. The objective theory also protects reliance induced by such
external manifestations of contractual assent and therefore provides
security and predictability to economic transactions. 2  Further,
accounts of the history of American and English contract law suggest such a history. Perillo,
supra note 4, at 427-29 (citing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 87
(1965); GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 12 (1974); HORWITZ, supra note 16, at
180-81). Professor Perillo convincingly states, however, that the dominant approach has
almost always been an objective one, with only a brief "flirtation" with subjective theory in
the early to mid nineteenth century. Perillo, supra note 4, at 428.
28. Martin J. Doris, Did We Lose the Baby with the Bath Water? The Late Scholastic
Contribution to the Common Law of Contracts, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 361, 372-73
(2005).
29. Id.
30. PERILLO, supra note 3, § 2.2, at 28.
31. See Ricketts, 153 E2d at 761 (Frank, J., concurring) ("The objectivists transferred
from the field of torts that stubborn anti-subjectivist, the 'reasonable man."').
32. Daniel P O'Gorman, A State of Disarray The 'Knowing and Voluntary"
Standard for Releasing Claims Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 8 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 111-12 (2005) ("The objective theory is strongly supported by those who
place the basis of contract law upon the promisee's justified reliance upon a promise or upon
355
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objectivists argue that the objective theory furthers concerns of
personal autonomy. When a party is entitled to rely on what can be
objectively verified, as opposed to being required to guess at the
internal thoughts of another person, there is a better capability to
synthesize information and order one's affairs accordingly.33
Il. THE FRENCH SUBJECTIVE THEORY OF CONTRACT AND
COMPARISON TO OBJECTIVIST RULES
A. Introduction
Mutual consent is at the heart of contract law, and this is no
different in France than in the other nations of the world.34 That
English law (as well as others) should have this similarity to French
law is unsurprising, "[f]or the philosophical, moral and economic pre-
suppositions were the same on both sides of the channel."" Though
the requirement of mutual consent-a consensus ad idem-is
common to French and English law, there are important conceptual
differences.36 One of the primary philosophical differences is in the
way that the "consensus" is understood. English law, and most of the
world, employs an objective appearance approach, which is practical
and yields more certainty in transactions for commercial expediency."
the needs of society and trade. An objective test is believed to protect 'the fundamental
principle of the security of business transactions."' (citing JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M.
PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 25 (2d ed. 1977) (quoting WILLISTON, supra note 27, § 35,
at 96))); see also Empro Mfg. Co. v. Ball-Co Mfg., Inc., 870 E2d 423, 425 (7th Cir. 1989)
(Easterbrook, J.) ("[l]f intent were wholly subjective ... no one could know the effect of a
commercial transaction until years after the documents were inked. That would be a
devastating blow to business."); Ricketts, 153 E2d at 761 n.2 ("The 'actual intent' theory, said
the objectivists, being 'subjective' and putting too much stress on unique individual
motivations, would destroy that legal certainty and stability which a modem commercial
society demands. They depicted the 'objective' standard as a necessary adjunct of a 'free
enterprise' economic system."); MURRAY, supra note 17, § 30, at 62 ("Under [the subjective
theory], no system of contract law could ever prove workable since it would be impossible to
prove the subjective intention of either party at any time.").
33. See Empro Mfg. Co., 870 E2d at 425.
34. See THOMAS GLYN WATKIN, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO MODERN CIVIL
LAW 283 (1999) ("Contractual obligations are those which arise out of the agreement of the
parties, and constitute the most important and numerous categories of obligations in modem
civil law.").
35. NICHOLAS, supra note 9, at 33.
36. Id at 34. Allan Farnsworth has traced the origin of the phrase "meeting of the
minds" in English law, dating back to a sixteenth-century case using the word
"aggreamentum, which is no other than a union, collection, copulation, and conjunction of
two or more minds in any thing done or to be done." Farnsworth, supra note 22, at 943-44
(citing Reniger v. Fogossa, (1551) 75 Eng. Rep. 1 (K.B.)).
37. NICHOLAS, supra note 9, at 34.
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French doctrine, on the other hand, "attaches the binding force to
the subjective will."3 That is, French law inclines more toward the
pure subjective "meeting of the minds" approach in theory, "though
sometimes with a corrective which yields much the same practical
result as the objective approach"" Stated differently, a "subjective
'internalisation' of contractual obligations-the meeting of minds or
concurrence of two or more independent wills-though evidently
supported by external, objective elements became the cornerstone of
the French natural law theory of contract."'
An important factor in the development of the subjective theory
of French contract-the will theory-was almost certainly the
freedom of the individual, which was the prevailing philosophy of the
eighteenth century, especially in France in the time leading up to and
following the French revolution.4' The French Republic's motto-
38. LITVINOFF, supranote 16, § 135, at 224.
39. NICHOLAS, supra note 9, at 34; see also CONTRACT LAW TODAY: ANGLO-FRENCH
COMPARISONS 17 (Donald Harris & Denis Tallon eds., 1989) ("[T]he English lawyer will find
that the French give a more subjective meaning than he does to the requirement of consent.");
Filip de Ly, Commercial Law as a Refuge from Contract Law A Comparative and Uniform
Law Perspective, 45 WAYNE L. REv. 1825, 1853 (2000) ("The French subjective contract law
theory is still based on a liberal assumption that parties should be free to decide whether, and
to what extent, they want to be bound."); Perillo, supra note 4, at 430 ("[T]he Will Theory...
is alive and well in France today." (citing NICHOLAS, supra note 9, at 35, 47-49)); Julian S.
Waterman, Book Review, 47 YALE L.J. 1033, 1035 (1938) (reviewing GILBERT MADRAY, DES
CONTRATS D'APRS LA RE CENTE CODIFICATION PRIVtE FAITE AuX ETATS-UNIS (1936)) ("[T]he
'subjective' theory... is regarded as the only true one in prevailing French doctrine.").
40. Doris, supra note 28, at 367 n.33.
41. NICHOLAS, supr note 9, at 31 ("The treatment of contract in the Code civil
echoes the philosophy of the eighteenth century. The starting-point is the freedom of the
individual, which can be curtailed only by free will, either in the original social contract or,
within society, by individual acts of will."); see also WATKIN, supra note 34, at 307 ("The
French Code civil was a product of the natural law school of jurisprudence associated with
the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. The view of society upheld by the thinkers of that
school was based upon the concept of the social contract, which regarded society as based
upon an agreement made by individuals. Contract therefore was seen as central to human
social existence and the individual freedom to enter into contractual arrangements as a basic
social good."); WH[NCUP, supra note 11, at 33 ("[Article 1101] [e]xpress[es] the principles of
eighteenth century French philosophers on the fundamental importance of free will .... ");
Max Radin, Contract Obligation and the Human Will, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 575, 575-76 (1943)
("The 'subjective' theory as it was developed in nineteenth century Germany and France dealt
with obligations in general. Its fullest statement is Ihering's, who had much to say of the
'primacy of the will.' Men ought to be bound only when they deliberately chose to be and to
the extent that they chose. Why this seemed a desirable ideal is not difficult to discover. It
flattered the sense of individual self-sufficiency which was so large a part of the sense of
freedom, as the eighteenth century had understood it and as Manchester had sought to
effectuate it in the nineteenth century.").
This is not to say that the spirit of the French Revolution was the only source for the
development of the free will and French subjective theory. In fact, the concept of contracting
only by consent was probably initially a product of canon law and that of "the sanctity of the
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"Libert, Egalit, Fatemit"-was the ideological framework behind
the thinking of the day, and this spilled over into the law of contracts.42
This virtue of freedom of contract and free will was in part the result
of "'[a] gospel of freedom [that] was preached by both metaphysical
and political philosophers in the latter half of the eighteenth century
.... [I]t was a corollary of the philosophy of freedom and
individualism that the law ought to extend the sphere and enforce the
obligation of contract.'" As Chloros aptly demonstrates:
[I]t can be assumed that natural law, rationalist philosophy, Kant's
notion of free will, must all have contributed to this transition from
individual contracts to a general theory of contract. Thus, at the end of
the eighteenth century the real intention of the parties had become
sacrosanct. It had acquired the dignity of a political and legal principle
which became known as the theory of the autonomy of will. This
meant, in effect, first, that the real intention must prevail over form,
secondly, that the will of the parties is superior to law .... 44
This theory of free will of parties to govern their affairs is reflected in
article 1134 of the French Civil Code: 'Agreements legally formed
have the character of loi for those who have made them."'" This
philosophy of the "autonomy of the will" was a natural companion to
the idea of laissez-faire and the idea that that people are the best judges
of their own interests.46 "The theory [of the autonomy of the will] was
taken for granted as the foundation of contractual doctrine in all Civil
law countries in the nineteenth century.'
3 7
moral obligation to be bound by a promise." Chloros, supra note 8, at 614; see also RENE
DAVID, ENGLISH LAW AND FRENCH LAw: A COMPARISON IN SUBSTANCE 102 (1980) ("In
France and on the continent of Europe on the contrary the reason why a contract should be
recognized as legally binding is a moral reason, not an economic one. Fides est servandz
one is bound in conscience to keep his word; this is a principle affirmed by the Church, which
the canonists have succeeded in introducing into the law.").
42. See.JOHN BELL ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAW 306 (1998).
43. Doris, supra note 28, at 362 (quoting Samuel Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6
CORNELL L.Q. 365, 366-67 (1921)); see also Chloros, supra note 8, at 607 ("In time,
particularly as a result of the influence of metaphysical and naturalistic thought during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the principle of contract by consent acquired a rather
elaborate and abstract meaning which gave rise to a large variety of theories.").
44. Chloros, supra note 8, at 615 (citing 2 MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGES RIPERT,
TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL 7 (3d ed. 1949)); see also DAVID, supra note 41, at 112
("Legal philosophy in the 18th and in the 19th century, in France as well as in England,
extolled the dogma of party autonomy (autonomie de la volonte) based on the philosophical
assumption that the binding force of a promise, or of a contract, can only rest on the will of
the parties.").
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All of these principles were taken for granted by the jurists in
France at the time of the creation of the French Civil Code. Article
1101 of the French Civil Code defines contract as "an agreement by
which one or more persons obligate themselves to one or more other
persons to give, or to do or not to do, something." 8 Article 1108 of the
Code, in turn, provides four conditions essential to the validity of the
agreement-the very first one, of paramount importance, is "the
consent of the party who binds himself."9 This simple phrase became
the bedrock of the consensualist theory of contract which still
predominates in France.
The first source of contract law in France is, of course, the Civil
Code itself. However, the writings of the French jurist Pothier were
highly influential in the thinking behind the French Civil Code sections
governing contracts." In his introduction to the concept of consent in
contracts for sale, Pothier stated that
[t]he consent of the parties, which is of the essence of the contract of
sale, consists in a concurrence of the will of the seller, to sell a
particular thing to the buyer, for a particular price, and of the buyer, to
buy of him the same thing for the same price."
Pothier recognized that determining such consent was not problematic
when the two contracting parties were conducting negotiations in the
presence of each other.52 However, when parties are contracting from a
distance, as by the use of correspondence through the mails, Pothier
asserted that "it is necessary that the will of the party, who makes a
48. C. civ. art. 1101 (Fr.), translated in ARTHuR TAYLOR VON MEHREN & JAMES
RUSSELL GORDLEY, THE CIvIL LAW SYSTEM 1167 (2d ed. 1977).
49. Id. art. 1108, translated in VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 48, at 1168.
Article 1108 provides in full as follows: "Four conditions are essential to the validity of an
agreement: the consent of the party who binds himself; his capacity to contract; a definite
object which forms the subject matter of the agreement; a licit cause for the obligation." Id.
50. Ronald J. Scalise Jr., Why No 'Efficient Breach" in The Civil Law?: A
Comparative Assessment of the Doctne ofEfficient Breach of Contract, 55 AM. J. COMP. L.
721, 741 (2007); see also NICHOLAS, supra note 9, at 33 (noting Pothier's contributions to the
French Civil Code, particularly to the sections relating to the theory of autonomy of the will);
Doris, supra note 28, at 362 n.5 ("Traditional European legal historians and contract theorists
commonly view the French theorists Jean Domat, the great initiator, to whom we owe the
concept of 'natural equity' and Robert Pothier, whose analysis of contract formed the basis of
the French Code Civil of 1804, as founders of the 'will theory."'). In the French Civil Code,
as in most other civil law jurisdictions, the law of "contracts" is actually part of a greater body
of law called "obligations." Obligations consists of both consensual agreements (contracts),
as well as "delictual" obligations (akin to common law torts). WATKIN, supra note 34, at 282-
84.
51. R.J. POTHIER, TREATISE ON THE CONTRACT OF SALE 17 (L.S. Cushing trans.,




proposition in writing, should continue until his letter reaches the other
party, and until the other party declares his acceptance of the
proposition." 3 Pothier's views, sounding squarely in classical French
subjective theory, were the basis for the consensualist philosophy of
the French law of contracts in the Civil Code, and in French writings
on contract law.
Though the French law of contracts undoubtedly sounds in
subjective theory, an analysis of some specific rules in French contract
law will reveal-through the interposing of some ameliorative
doctrines to account for the results that otherwise occur from the initial
application of these subjective rules-that the law in France is not so
very different from that in the Anglo-American jurisdictions, which
espouse a more objective theory of contracts, not to mention the
majority of other world jurisdictions, which also follow an objective
model of contractual consent.
B. Revocability of Offers
The French subjective theory of contract manifests itself in the
accepted doctrine on revocation of offers. All legal systems, including
France, require that an offer must be actually received by the offeree
before it is operative to create the power of acceptance in the offeree
Here, however, the concern is with the extent that the law requires
communication and receipt of an offeror's revocation in order for it to
be effective to terminate the power of acceptance. In objective theory,
of course, though an offer may generally be freely revoked prior to
acceptance, any such revocation is not effective to terminate the
offeree's power of acceptance until the revocation is received by the
offeree." However, with the French subjective theory and pure
"autonomy of will" philosophy, this is not the case. Rather, once the
offeror changes his mind and revokes, the offeree's power of
acceptance ends at that moment regardless of whether the offeree was
instantaneously aware of the revocation (as long as there is some
external evidence of the offeror's change of mind, for reasons of proof
only)."  The fact that there could not have been a subjective
concurrence of the wills is conclusive."
53. Id. at 18.
54. See BONASSIES ET AL., supm note 4, at 104.
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 42 (1981).
56. NICHOLAS, supra note 9, at 63-64. French law, of course, also agrees with
English and American law that if the offeree learns that the offeror no longer intends to be
370 [Vol. 83:359
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A French case from the Cour d'appel in Montpellier is
illustrative. A landowner offered to sell property to an offeree, but
prior to the offeree's acceptance the owner contended there could be no
contract because he had already sold the property to a third party in the
intervening time period between the offer and the attempted
acceptance.58 The offeror's argument was rejected; not, however,
because the offeree was not aware of the alleged sale to the third party
(which would have been sufficient to terminate the power of
acceptance under objective theory). 9 Rather, the court rejected the
offeror's argument because it found factually that the offeror had not,
in fact, sold the property yet at the time the offeree made an operative
acceptance, and therefore there had not been an effective revocation."
Had there indeed been a sale to a third party, it appears from French
doctrine that the court would have been satisfied that there had been a
revocation even before the offeree came to have knowledge of such
sale.
This French rule on revocability of offers being operative
instantly, even prior to communication to the offeree, has its origins in
pre-Code analysis by Pothier himself:
This will is presumed to continue, if nothing appears to the contrary;
but, if I write a letter to a merchant living at a distance, and therein
propose to him, to sell me a certain quantity of merchandise, for a
certain price; an4 before my letter has tme to reach him, I write a
secon4 infomiing him that Ino longer wish to make the bargain, or if I
die; or lose the use of my reason; although the merchant, on the receipt
ofmy letter, being in ignorance ofmy change of twll, or of my death or
insanity, makes answer that he accepts the proposed bargain; yet there
bound, the power of acceptance is terminated at that point. See BONASSIES ET AL., supFa note
4, at 812.
The French position on effectiveness of undeclared revocations seems fairly clear from
the reported French cases discussing the problem of an undeclared revocation. See id at 815-
18. However, the French doctrine writers seem more divided on the subject, though they
concede that the cases point towards a subjective view of the matter. Id
57. NICHOLAS, supra note 9, at 63-64. Interestingly, a famous English case, Cooke v
Oxley, has been widely interpreted by most scholars as deciding the same principle under
English law. (1790) 100 Eng. Rep. 785 (K.B.); see, e.g., Farnsworth, supra note 22, at 944-
45. However, Professor Perillo has recently taken exception with this characterization and
asserts that the case was decided purely on grounds of consideration. Perillo, supra note 4, at
436-38.
58. NICHOLAS, supra note 9, at 64 (citing a case which was upheld in Cour de
cassation [Cass. le civ.] [highest court of ordinary jurisdiction] Dec. 17, 1958, D. 1959,juris.
33).
59. See Dickinson v. Dodds, (1876) 2 Ch. D. 463 (U.K.) (holding that offeror's offer
to sell was indirectly revoked by offeree's knowledge of intervening sale to a third party).
60. NICHOLAS, supra note 9, at 64.
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will be no contract ofsale between us, for, as my will does not continue
until his receipt of my letter, and his acceptance of the proposition
contained in it, there is not that consent or concurrence of our wills,
which is necessary to constitute the contract ofsale.'
Here lies the origin of much of the rhetoric in French contract law that
subjective mutual assent is required, rather than merely objective
assent. Pothier is saying that an offeror, who has created the
appearance of a willingness to contract by his initial mailed offer, may
nevertheless terminate the offeree's power of acceptance by the mere
act of writing a subsequent revocation. And this appears to cut off the
offeree's power to accept, regardless of whether the offeree has
received the revocation or has knowledge of it. Pothier simply says
that once the revocation is written (and perhaps dispatched; the text
leaves some room for interpretation) there is no longer a possible
"concurrence of wills" and therefore there can be no contract." The
termination of the power of acceptance by either the intervening death
or insanity of the offeror is a familiar concept to the common law.63
However, Pothier's assertion that an offeror's unreceived revocation
could terminate the offeree's power of acceptance is quite a divergence
from the objective theory concept that a revocation is only effective
when received by the offeree.6' Though the offeror's revocation letter is
some "objective" evidence of his internal intention no longer to be
bound by his prior manifestation of assent, it is still purely "subjective"
in the sense that at the moment the revocation is written and sent only
the offeror knows about it. To the offeree, it is as though it has not
occurred yet, because he has not become objectively aware of it. This
is, therefore, a fairly clear illustration of the origins of the French
subjective theory of contract."
61. POTHIER, supra note 51, at 18 (emphasis added). Pothier further mentioned his
sources for these propositions, and noted a divergence from Roman law in the matter: "This
is the opinion of Bartholus and the other jurists cited by Bruneman, who very properly reject
the contrary opinion of the Gloss, addhctam legem." Id
62. Id; see also Perillo, supra note 4, at 465 ("Pothier asserted that the mere dispatch
of a letter of revocation (objective evidence of subjective intention) will revoke an offer
subject to the offeror's liability to indemnify an offeree who takes concrete steps in reliance
on the offer." (citing POTHIER, supm note 5 1, at 32)).
63. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 36 (1981).
64. See id ("An offeree's power of acceptance is terminated when the offeree receives
from the offeror a manifestation of an intention not to enter into the proposed contract.").
65. See Joseph M. Perillo, Robert J Pothiert Influence on the Common Law of
Contrac4 11 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REv. 267, 287 (2005) ("Pothier espoused a subjective
approach to contract law.").
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Though this subjective approach to revocation appears
philosophically at odds with the objective approach, which requires the
offeree to become aware of the revocation before it operates to
terminate the power of acceptance, there is a mitigating principle in
French law that greatly reduces the difference in outcomes. In this
case, the principle is that offers are not nearly as freely revocable in the
first place as they are in common law jurisdictions. Though in
principle an offer may be revoked prior to acceptance,66 French
doctrine provides that an offer usually must be held open-that is, it is
irrevocable-for any period of time stated, or if no period of time is
stated, then for a reasonable time.67 The reason typically given for the
French rule of temporarily-imposed irrevocability is that the offeree
must be afforded sufficient time "to learn about the offer and to
examine it."68 Classical French doctrine states that the rule making
offers binding is necessary for commerce, and that 'everybody'
recognizes the practical necessity of such a rule."69 Not everybody, of
course, because the French rule is in contrast to the general rule in
English and American law that offers are freely revocable, even if a
66. See BONASSLES ET AL., supra note 4, at 769-70.
67. NICHOLAS, supm note 9, at 64. In the Cour de cassation case described above, the
court noted, prior to concluding there had been no revocation:
[W]hile an offer may in principle be revoked as long as it has not been accepted,
the position is different where the offeror has expressly or impliedly undertaken not
to revoke before a certain time; and in the present case the judgment of the court
below notes that ... [offeror], having tacitly obliged himself to keep his offer open
[until after [offeree] had made his inspection], could not have revoked the offer [on
the day alleged] without committing 'a fault of a kind which would entail liability
on his part.'
Id.; see also BONASSIES ET AL., supra note 4, at 772 ("The theoretical rule that in French law
an offer normally is revocable is further attenuated by the general recognition of the
presumption, or more exactly of a requirement, of temporary irrevocability."); PARVIZ OWSIA,
FORMATION OF CONTRACT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY UNDER ENGLISH, FRENCH, ISLAMIC AND
IRANIAN LAW 448-57 (1994); 2 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO
COMPARATIVE LAW 39 (Tony Weir trans., 2d rev. ed. 1987).
68. BONASSIES ET AL., supra note 4, at 772 (citations omitted).
69. Artur Nussbaum, Comparative Aspects of the Anglo-Amenican Offer-and-
Acceptance Doctrine, 36 COLLIM. L. REV. 920, 925 (1936) (citing 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, SUpra
note 16, at 172-73); see also Nussbaum, supra, at 925 ("Professor Vivante, though for
conceptualistic reasons adverse to the giving up of revocation, confesses: 'The practical
exigencies outweigh the law."' (quoting 4 CESARE VIVANTE, TRATrATO DI DIRITMO
COMMERCIALE 42 (5th ed. 1929))).
Of course, the Anglo-American commentators and jurists cite the need for commercial
expediency as the reason for the universe of objective theory-based rules on mutual assent, as
well. See, e.g., Ricketts v. Pa. R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 762 (2d Cir. 1946) ("Williston, the leader
of the objectivists, insists that, as to all contracts, without differentiation, the objective theory
is essential because 'founded upon the fundamental principle of the security of business
transactions."' (quoting WILLISTON, supra note 27, § 35)).
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period of time is stated in the offer, unless consideration has been paid
to hold the offer open as an option contract, or some other exception is
applicable (though, it should be noted, that a trend in the United States
can be discerned towards making offers binding)."
There is one other point to consider, then, and that is the effect of
prematurely revoking the offer if it was supposed to have been held
open for a period of time, and was thus irrevocable. In Anglo-
American jurisdictions, the attempt to revoke is simply held to be
ineffective.71 In France, on the other hand, a premature revocation is
effective because of the subjective theory and "concurrence of wills"
paradigm. However, it is nevertheless considered wrongful and will
therefore result in some measure of liability, usually a reliance-based
recovery of damages.72
Pothier, too, addressed the possible injustice to an unsuspecting
offeree who receives an offer and intends to accept it, only to
70. ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 67, at 43 ("[T]he doctrine of consideration which
is deeply rooted in [Anglo-American] contract law is strongly opposed to the binding force of
offers. Nevertheless there is a clear trend in state legislation in the United States towards
making offers binding and there are also extralegal factors which limit the capricious
withdrawal of offers: withdrawal may be legally permissible but it is recognized to be unfair
and commercial men consequently avoid it."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 25 (1981) (providing a general requirement that option contracts have all the
requisites of an ordinary contract, which includes consideration); id § 45 (providing for the
irrevocability of certain offers where acceptance by performance has begun, even absent
consideration); id. § 37 (providing that option contracts cannot be revoked prior to the time
stated in the option); U.C.C. § 2-205 (2008) (providing that in an offer to sell goods by a
merchant in writing, any commitment to hold the offer open is enforceable even without
consideration).
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 37.
72. See BONASSIES ET AL., supra note 4, at 771-72; see also NICHOLAS, supra note 9,
at 64-67. There is some debate in the French doctrine and jurisprudence about the basis of
recovery for an offeree aggrieved by a prematurely revoking offeror. Even in France, it seems
clear that there is no basis for recovery in contract per se, because the offeror's subjective
revocation (albeit premature) prevented the "concurrence of wills" necessary for contract
formation under French law. NICHOLAS, supr note 9, at 65. This leaves two approaches
which are proffered. First, some commentators assert that the offeror's liability is based on
his "unilateral juridical act" of making the offer. Id. The effect of this approach is essentially
to simply deny the effect of the revocation. Id. The other approach of French commentators
is to allow the premature revocation to be effective to prevent contract formation, but
nevertheless to declare that the offeror is liable on a "delictual obligation" (roughly akin to
making it a "tort," in language accessible to the common lawyer). Id The primary difference
between the two approaches is in remedy-declaring the offeror has committed a "unilateral
juridical act" will result in a contract, expectation-based measure of recovery; whereas,
asserting that the revocation is a delictual wrong will usually result in a reliance-based
measure of recovery. Id.; see also BONASSIES ET AL., supra note 4, at 775-76 (noting a
division among scholars on the theoretical basis for remedy upon revocation); ZWEIGERT &
KOTZ, supra note 67, at 39-40 (comparing the two views of an offeror's liability upon
revocation).
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subsequently discover that the offeror had unknowingly revoked the
offer before the offeree's acceptance. Pothier recognized this problem,
and provided the following commentary explaining the availability of
an estoppel-type remedy in this event:
It must be observed, however, that, if my letter causes the merchant to
be at any expense, in proceeding to execute the contract proposed; or if
it occasions him any loss, as, for example, if, in the intermediate time
between the receipt of my first and that of my second letter, the price of
that particular kind of merchandise falls, and my first letter deprives
him of an opportunity to sell it before the fall of the price; in all these
cases, I am bound to indemnify him, unless I prefer to agree to the
bargain as proposed by my first letter. This obligation results from that
rule of equity, that no person should suffer from the act of another:
Nemo ex alterius facto prgavai debet. I ought therefore to
indemnify him for the expense and loss, which I occasion him by
making a proposition, which I afterwards refuse to execute.73
Thus, Pothier is providing that in French doctrine, although there is
technically no mutual assent, and thus no contract at the instant of
intended revocation, the law must nevertheless protect the reliance of
an offeree who proceeds on the basis that there is a contract without
knowledge that the offeror's intention has ceased to exist. This
estoppel-type remedy goes a long way toward ameliorating the
harshness that would otherwise exist if the "pure" French subjective
theory as stated in the first instance was the only applicable doctrine.
To see the comparison between the two systems of law in this
regard, an example is illustrative. Assume that A writes an offer and
sends it to B on January 1, and B receives it on January 3. The offer
proposes to provide a certain service to B, at a particular price, and
further states that A wishes to hear from B on the proposal by January
10. Under both systems, there will be an offer as of January 3. Now
assume that on January 5, A writes a revocation and deposits it in the
mail. On January 6, B (who does not know of A's intent to revoke)
decides to accept and deposits an acceptance in the mail, and further
incurs certain expenses in the belief that a contract has been formed (or
is imminent). On January 7, B receives A's revocation, and on January
8, A receives Hfs acceptance.
Under Anglo-American objective theory the case would be easily
resolved. There is a contract, because Hs acceptance occurred upon
73. POTMER, supranote 51, at 18-19.
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dispatch under the "mailbox rule."7 And, more importantly for present
purposes, A's attempt at revocation was ineffective because, though A
was free to revoke at any point before acceptance, the attempt did not
take effect upon declaration or even dispatch, but rather could only
have taken effect upon receipt.75 Therefore, A's attempt at revocation
was simply ineffective, and there is thus a contract.
Under French subjective theory, the case is a bit more complex.
There would be no contract. First, it would appear that A did not have
the right to try to revoke before a reasonable time, or more probably,
the time stated in his offer to B.76 Nevertheless, A still had the power
to revoke, and he diin fact revoke by manifesting and declaring that
he no longer wished to enter into the contract with B-a point
crystallized by drafting the revocation and depositing it in the mail.
Once the revocation took effect there could be no contract because
there was no subjective "concurrence of wills" between the parties,
and this was so from the moment of declaring and depositing the
revocation-well before B even received the revocation and acquired
knowledge of it. However, the French outcome is ultimately similar to
the objective theory because B would have a delictual (tort) claim
against A for the wrongful, premature revocation, and the damages
recovered would approximate at least some portion of those which B
would recover against A for a breach of contract in an objective theory
jurisdiction.
As can be seen, the French rules-though at first seemingly at
complete odds with the objective theory so prevalent in most of the
rest of the world-in actuality produce little significant difference in
results.77 Under both theories in the example above, B will collect
damages from A, though the path to this result is much different in the
two systems; under objective theory it is simply by formation of a
contract, whereas French law refuses to recognize a contract because
of subjective theory, but nevertheless awards B recovery because A's
74. See Adams v. Lindsell, (1818) 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B.); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63 ("Unless the offer provides otherwise, ... an acceptance made
in a manner and by a medium invited by an offer is operative and completes the manifestation
of mutual assent as soon as put out of the offeree's possession, without regard to whether it
ever reaches the offeror... ").
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 42.
76. NICHOLAS, supra note 9, at 64.
77. Id. ("It can be said that the law of delict is brought in to correct the subjective
view of consensus which prevails in French law and which treats a manifested, even if
uncommunicated, revocation as effective, whereas the less subjective approach of English law
makes the requirement of communication do the work done in French law by the law of
delict.").
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revocation was a delictual wrong. Thus, the "subjective" rhetoric of
French contract law does not produce irreconcilable differences with
France's Anglo-American brethren, a point very significant in the
context of a desired global harmonization of law.
C Need for Communication ofAcceptance
Another significant rule of contract formation, which warrants
analysis from an objective/subjective perspective, is whether
acceptances must be communicated or not. Barry Nicholas states
what one would initially expect the French subjective theory rule on
acceptance to be
in accord with ... the French attitude to consensus if it were sufficient
that the offeree should decide to accept, or rather, for practical reasons
of proof, should manifest this decision. For at that moment the two
wills are at one, and communication of the acceptance can add nothing.
And this (commonly called the theory of 6mission) has indeed been the
predominant view of the writers. But others have argued that what is
needed is not merely the co-existence of two wills, but mutual
awareness of such co-existence, i e the communication of the
acceptance (theory of information).78
On the other hand, an early nineteenth-century French
commentator, Merlin," provided a colorful "acoustic vault"
hypothetical to illustrate the limits of the subjective approach, even in
France:
"A man has in his office an acoustic vault, made in such a manner that
as a result of the various and extremely multiplied twistings of the pipes
of which it is constructed, words spoken into one end arrive at the other
only after five minutes. Suppose I am with this man in this very office.
There after saying to me, 'Will you buy?' he adds, 'Answer me by
means of my acoustic vault.' Thereupon we place ourselves at either
end of the vault, and I say to him by means of his instrument, 'I will
indeed.' But a moment later I change my mind, I run up to him, and
before he is able to hear my answer, say to him 'I do not want to.'
Could he claim, after hearing the answer which I originally made by
means of his acoustic vault, that I could not retract it, because it was
transmitted to him by means of pipes which he owns, and consequently
78. Id. at 69-70.
79. "Merlin had been from 1801 to 1814 procureurgon6al at the Cour de Cassation.
Having been a prominent participant in revolutionary actions, he was exiled after the
restoration of the Bourbons." Nussbaum, supm note 69, at 920 n. 10.
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became his property the moment it left my mouth? No, clearly no, a
hundred times no!" °
This passage is illuminating in that it demonstrates that the French
subjective theory, even in early nineteenth-century France, was not as
dogmatically inflexible as some historians assume. In this
hypothetical, theoretically the initial instant at which the offeree voiced
his acceptance "into the vault" there was a subjective concurrence of
wills, such that a contract could be said to have been formed under
pure subjective theory. But even French law did not ever go this far, as
demonstrated by the hypothetical.
Turning to the modem law in France, there are a few instances in
the French Civil Code that require an express acceptance to be
communicated by the offeree to the offeror. This has to do with certain
very specific and narrowly applicable areas, such as gifts and leases of
farm land." It is also clear that in France, as in most other
jurisdictions, the offeror is empowered to waive the requirement that
the acceptance be communicated.82
Beyond these specific instances, however, modem French law on
the necessity of communicated acceptances (by correspondence) is
somewhat murky.3
No statutory provision of general application governs the subject. It is
impossible to derive a general principle from particular provisions....
[However, it appears that in] France the prevailing tendency is to hold as
a rule that communication of acceptance is not, in itself, necessary to
the formation of a contract. s
80. Id at 920-21 n. 11 (quoting 36 M. MERLIN, REPERTOIRE UNIVERSEL ET RAISONNt
DE JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed. 1828)).
81. See BONASSIES ETAL, supm note 4, at 1314-15. Article 932 of the Code provides
that 'a gift is effective as to the donor only when the act of acceptance is made known to
him."' ld. at 1314. Further,
[a]rticles 790 ff. of the Rural Code (arts. 1 ff. of the ordinance of 17 Oct. 1945),
relating to leases of farm land, provide that the lessee shall have a pre-emption
right at a fair price if the owner of rural property wishes to sell it.... [After the
owner sends the lessee the intent to sale by registered letter, t]he lessee has two
months to make known his acceptance or refusal.... [T]he acceptance must be
communicated to the owner "in the same form" as the offer, that is, by registered
mail, return receipt requested.
Id
82. Id at 1315 (citing 1 Sources des Obligations, in 2 RENE DEMOGUE, TRAITE DES
OBLIGATIONS EN GENERAL § 557, at 181 (1923)).
83. Id
84. Id. The problem, of course, only generally arises when contracts are entered into
by correspondence, as opposed to contracts negotiated in person. See P.D.V MARSH,
COMPARATIVE CONTRACT LAW: ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY 73 (1994) ("For contracts
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This is less clear from reading French doctrine and commentators on
the subject, though it appears to be more clear from French cases.85
Though there are some objectivists among French commentators,
the subjectivist view appears to hold more sway. Ripert and Boulanger
state the objectivist view: "'It is not the acceptance that concludes the
contract, but the offeror's knowledge of the intention to accept.""'8 But
the predominant view among French writers is a more subjective one
that theoretically does not recognize a need for the acceptance to be
communicated and received by the offeror:
On the other hand, it seems that for the writers who hold that the
contract is formed at the moment the acceptance is dispatched,
communication of acceptance is not in itself an element necessary to
perfection of the contract. According to these authors, the significance
of sending the acceptance lies merely in the fact that it proves with
sufficient certainty the intention to accept. When such proof can be
deduced and is in fact deduced by the court from other circumstances,
such as performance or other conduct, no communication of acceptance
is necessary.
... "The essential element of the contract ... is intention; if that can
only be demonstrated by its exteriorization, it is because that is
necessary to make the intention perceptible; but from the moment an
external manifestation of the intention has taken place, it ought to be
effective. To require that the intenton of the acceptor be made known
which are formed between people who are present together, which would also include as
regards the time at which the contract was concluded those formed by a telephone
conversation, French law is the same as English. The acceptance must be communicated.");
NICHOLAS, supra note 9, at 70 (stating that problems with offer and acceptance usually arise
in contracts by correspondence); ZWEIGERT & KOTz, supra note 67, at 36 ("No difficulty
arises when the contract is concluded between persons who are in the same place or who,
though separated, are in immediate communication, by telephone or otherwise.... It is when
a contract is to be concluded at a distance, inter absentes, by the exchange of letters or other
embodiments of the parties' declarations, that the problems arise.").
85. BONASSIES ETAL., supra note 4, at 1316-21.
86. Id. at 1316 (quoting 2 GEORGES RIPERT & JEAN BOULANGER, TRAITE DE DROIT
CIVIL D'APRS LE TRAITE DE PLANIOL § 331, at 133 (1957)). Schlesinger notes that another
commentator, Demogue, has the same basic view. Id. (citing DEMOGUE, supra note 82, § 557,
at 540). Within the population of French commentators, two different theories of objective
indication of contractual intent have been discussed. The theory of reception provided that
the acceptance was operative at the moment that it physically arrived at the offeror's address.
However, the theory of information provided that the acceptance was not operative until the
moment that the offeror became actually aware of the acceptance. See id. at 1449-50;
NICHOLAS, supra note 9, at 70; see also WATKIN, supra note 34, at 308 (describing the two
theories regarding when acceptance becomes effective). As neither of these objective views
of acceptance efficacy have been very influential in the French literature, they will not be
discussed further.
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to the offeror is arbitrarily to add a new element to the intention and to
the contract.""
Other French commentators are equally clear on this subjectivist
stance. Thus, Mazeaud states:
"A contract is formed by the mutual consent of the parties; this consent
exists as soon as there is a meeting of the minds, that is to say, an offer
and an acceptance. To require knowledge of the acceptance is to add a
condiion for the formation of contracts which the law does not
wrquire.' 8
And, Colin adds: .' The fact that the acceptance is made known to the
offeror adds nothing to the legal consequences of the acceptance."'89
And the French cases appear generally to support this subjective stance
dispensing with the need for the acceptance to be communicated."
The primary instance in which the French cases have not
recognized the validity of an uncommunicated acceptance seems to be
those in which the offeror either expressly, or by implication, required
the acceptance to be communicated as a condition to the formation of
the contract.91 One illustrative case on this point involved owners of a
building who leased it to a company. The lease contained an option for
the tenant to purchase the property, which was required to be exercised
and ratified at a stockholders' meeting on or before October 1 st. The
owners made several inquiries as to whether the option was being
exercised and received no response, whereupon the owners purported
to revoke. In fact, they later learned that the tenant company had
attempted to exercise the option but did not notify the owners until
87. BoNASSIES ET AL., supra note 4, at 1316 (quoting I Les Obligations, in 2 GABRIEL
MARTY & PIERRE RAYNAUD, DROIT CIVIL § 111, at 95 (1962) (emphasis added)).
88. Id. at 1316 (quoting 2 HENRI ET LEON MAZEAUD & JEAN MAZEAUD, LECONS DE
DROIT CIVIL § 146, at 120 (2d ed. 1962) (emphasis added)).
89. Id. (quoting 2 AMBROISE COLIN & H. CAPITANT, COURS ELtMENTAIRE DE DROIT
CIVIL FRANCAIS (4th ed. 1924) (emphasis added)).
90. Id. at 1317-18. As Schlesinger notes, one case even enforced a contract in which
there had been no communication of acceptance at all, but rather the offeree was held to have
tacitly accepted the offer for a sale of goods by the beginning of performance. Id at 1318
(citing Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Affique Equitoriale Fran~aise, Sept. 10,
1921, sousChambre des requ&es [Cass. req.], April 1, 1924, S. 1925, juris. 371). Of course,
this is actually not so very far away from American law on the subject of potential acceptance
by performance. See U.C.C. § 2-206 (2008) (specifying that a seller may accept an offer to
buy goods by either promising to ship (i.e., communicating acceptance) or by promptly
shipping (i.e., performing)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 54 (1981) (specifying
manner in which offeree may accept by performance).
91. BONASSIES ETAL., supra note 4, at 1319.
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January. The court held the acceptance was not timely because it had
not been communicated by October 1 st.92 The case illustrates that
it is ... permissible for the offeror to require that the acceptance be
communicated to him as a condition of formation of the contract. Such
a condition may be expressly stated in the offer. It may also be
interpolated by the judges on the basis of the terms of the offer,
interpreted in the light of the circumstances of the case. 93
French cases tend to interpret the offer's reference to a particular date
for acceptance as meaning that the offeror intended to require that the
acceptance be communicated and received by such date.94 Thus, in
such instances, communication of the acceptance is required. But if no
such intention is ascertained-and the offer is instead a general,
"open" offer, open simply for a reasonable time under the
circumstances-the French subjective position instead prevails and
receipt of the acceptance is unnecessary for contract formation.
Once the concept of a subjective theory of acceptance in France
is conceded, there is still a further point of clarification to be made.
The French writers have, at various times, discussed two different
theories of acceptance effectiveness. The most subjective theory that
has ever been discussed in France is the theory of emission. That is,
if it is mutual consent which makes the contract, only declaration of the
acceptance, i.e., consent of the acceptor added to that of the offeror,
ought to be necessary to perfect the contract. From this it would follow
that the acceptance, once declared, becomes effective immediately,
regardless of whether and when the declaration is dispatched (or
expedited) to the offeror.96
As appealing as it is to purists in the French subjective tradition of
mutual assent, it appears that the emission theory is not seriously
considered as operative in French law: "[A]lthough several of the
writers do not explain their ideas very clearly, they seem to be
unanimous in rejecting the pure theory of declaration."'97
Instead, the majority of French commentators and cases appear to
follow the theory of expedition--that is, the acceptance is effective
upon dispatch of the acceptance so that it is put out of the offeree's
92. Id. (citing Cour de cassation [Cass. le civ.] Feb. 2, 1932, S. 1932, juris. 68; cf
Cour de cassation [Cass. le civ.] Dec. 21, 1960, D. 1961,juris. 417, note Malaurie).
93. Id
94. Id.
95. See NICHOLAS, supra note 9, at 70; see also WATKN, supra note 34, at 308
(describing the development of the theory of emission).
96. BONASSIES ET AL., supra note 4, at 1449.
97. Id.
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possession." As opposed to the more purely subjective emission
theory,
[t]he followers of the expedition theory assume, in effect, that only the
dispatch of the acceptance establishes the reality of the legal will
(consent) of the acceptor; and it is definitely this theory of declaration-
dispatch (ie., dispatch necessary to prove declaration of the acceptance)
which is generally postulated by consensualismY
Though the French doctrine and cases can appear at times to vary from
this general preference for the theory of expedon, it appears that
when such variation occurs it is usually because the court, as a
question of fact, has interpreted the offer to require that any acceptance
be actually communicated to, and received by, the offeror in order to
be effective."
The above principles notwithstanding, the problem of when and
to what extent communication of acceptance is required in France is
still complicated by at least two factors. First, the Cour de cassation
has left this decision to the lower courts as a pure question of fact
(rather than one governed by clear code sections or doctrine).'"' This is
evidenced by the Cour de cassation's admonition that "the time of
effective acceptance depends on the circumstances of the individual
98. Id. at 1448, 1455-63; See also BELL ETAL., supra note 42, at 312 ("[T]here seems
to be a preference both in the courts and the jurists for placing acceptance at the time and
place of sending."); F.H. LAWSON ET AL., AMOS & WALTON'S INTRODUCION TO FRENCH LAW
157 (3d ed. 1967); OwsIA, supra note 67, at 563 ("On balance, those presently in favour of
expedition theory appear to be in the majority."); WHINCUP, supra note 11, § 2.53, at 57 ("As
regards the time of acceptance, the question whether a contract is made when acceptance is
posted or when the offeror receives it (which is important in determining whether the offer
can still be revoked) has occupied the French courts more than the battle of the forms. The
issue is still treated case by case, although the courts tend generally to hold that acceptance is
given, and thus the contract made, when it is posted... ); P.H. Winfield, Some Aspects of
Offer andAcceptance, 55 L.Q. REv. 499, 507 (1939); cf Perillo, supra note 4, at 430 ("[T]he
French subjective theory explains why in France there is no definitive rule on whether an
acceptance is effective on dispatch or on receipt. This is because, under the subjective
approach, the meeting of the minds frequently is a question of fact.").
99. BONASSIES ET AL., supm note 4, at 1449.
100. Id at 1459-62 ("The basic rule, however, that the contract is formed by dispatch
of the acceptance, does not have to be made absolute. The offeror may be allowed the right to
condition his offer. In particular, he may provide that the contract becomes effective only
upon the double condition that the acceptance be communicated to him and that he has not
revoked the offer in the meantime.").
101. NICHOLAS, supra note 9, at 70-72. French law has generally decided that the
issue of whether the offer requires the acceptance to be communicated is one of fact.
BONASSIES ET AL., supra note 4, at 1320. To many commentators from other jurisdictions
"such an approach is unsound. A legal system which seeks to promote enforceability and
certainty of contracts, needs a rule (though not necessarily a cogent one) concerning the
moment when a contract is concluded." Id.
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case, especially on the intention of the parties, and is therefore not a
proper question for the highest court."'*0 2 There are no code rules in this
area, other than the one that provides that there simply must be an
agreement and consent to the agreement.' 3 Therefore,
[w]hether there is or is not an agreement is a matter of fact which
(leaving aside questions of defective consent) is wholly within the
pouvoir souverain dujuge du fond. it escapes the control of the Cour
de cassation. All that that court can do is to say whether or not the court
below, in exercising its pouvoir souvemrin, has so far misinterpreted the
facts as to 'denature' them.'10
The second complicating factor is, as stated above, that the lower
courts will often decide, as a factual matter in the case at hand, that the
particular offer at issue can be interpreted so as to require that the
acceptance be communicated. 5
However, notwithstanding these two complicating factors, it
appears that the residual, default rule applied by the majority of cases
and commentators in France is that an offer may be accepted, unless
otherwise specified, upon dispatch of the acceptance in the mail. The
French courts do treat the question as one of fact, variable by the
parties through a demonstration of their intention to contract around
the default rule. However, in spite of this, it is generally believed that
the French courts reach equitable results under this regime. 6
No need for comparative analysis exists here. The rule in Anglo-
American jurisdictions is the same. The expedition rule developed
under the subjective theory of French law, whereby the acceptance is
effective from the moment of dispatch even though the offeror does
not yet know of its existence, is in fact the same as that followed in
Anglo-American jurisdictions. We know the rule as the "mailbox
rule."'0 7  Like the expedition theory, the mailbox rule makes the
acceptance operative from the moment it is placed in the mail, or
102. ZWEIGERT&KOTz, supra note 67, at41.
103. NICHOLAS, supra note 9, at 59; see also MARSH, supra note 84, at 73 ("There is no
article dealing directly with the point in the Code Civil... .").
104. NICHOLAS, supra note 9, at 59; see also MARSH, supra note 84, at 73 ("[F]or a
long time the Cour de cassation refused to give any ruling other than that the issue was to be
determined as a matter of fact by lesjuges de fond').
105. NICHOLAS, supra note 9, at 70.
106. Id.
107. See Adams v. Lindsell, (1818) 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B.); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63 (1981) ("Unless the offer provides otherwise, an acceptance
made in a manner and by a medium invited by an offer is operative and completes the
manifestation of mutual assent as soon as put out of the offeree's possession, without regard
to whether it ever reaches the offeror....").
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otherwise put out of the offeree's possession, even if the acceptance
never reaches the offeror.18  Therefore, the rule obviously allows
formation of a contract by the offeree's dispatched acceptance before it
has ever been received by the offeror.1°9 The mailbox rule, quite
incontestably, is inconsistent with the objective theory of contracts, and
is instead a much more subjective rule. The seminal case of Adams v
Lindsell,"° which is usually credited with creating the rule in English
law, was decided at the very same point in history that the autonomy of
the will dominated global thinking about contract law and was in line
with such thinking."' It is undoubtedly a subjective rule, and is
undoubtedly the same basic rule as that of the French, notwithstanding
the different paradigms each legal system otherwise espouses.
D Some OtherAspects ofFormation and Interpretation
The foregoing discussion illustrates that, although the paradigms
of the objective and subjective systems are couched in distinct terms,
in actual effect the rules in the two systems regarding contract
formation-namely, regarding revocation of offers and communication
of acceptances-come very close to each other in actual operation. In
the remainder of this Part, I will briefly touch on a handful of other
doctrinal areas in contract law where the objective theory system
comes very close to approximating that of French subjective theory.
1. Death of Offeror
Another contract formation rule in France, which illustrates the
subjective theory that pervades French contract law, is that the
intervening death of the offeror-subsequent to the offer being made
and prior to an effective acceptance being made by the offeree-will
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63(a); FARNSWORTH, supra note 17,
§ 3.22, at 337; see also Beth A. Eisler, Default Rules for Contract Formation by Promise and
the Need for Revision of the Mailbox Rule, 79 Ky. L.J. 557, 563 (1990) (citing United
Leasing, Inc. v. Commonwealth Land Title Agency, Inc., 656 P2d 1246, 1250 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1982)). The benefit of this rule depends, however, on the acceptance being dispatched
properly, such as to the correct addressee and with the proper address. See PERILLO, supra
note 3, § 2.23(a), at 110 ("The [mailbox rule] prevails generally throughout the U.S., with the
qualification that the acceptance must be dispatched in a proper manner."). The mailbox rule
is also the "default" rule, and the result is otherwise when the offer specifically provides that
the acceptance must be actually received in order to be effective. See id § 2.22, at 107.
109. See MuRRAY, supra note 17, § 47(A), at 160.
110. (1818) 106 Eng. Rep. 250(K.B.).
11. Williston, supra note 16, at 87; see also KEVIN M. TEEVEN, A HISTORY OF THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 182 (1990) (stating "the subjective standard
was reinforced" by Adams v Lindsell), citedin Perillo, supra note 4, at 439 n.77.
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terminate the offer, assuming the offer was generally revocable in the
first place."2 This is certainly applicable when the offered proposal is
personal to one of the parties; that is, when the offer is made intiutu
personae."3 This would include, for example, a partnership contract, or
one to render services, such as with an architect."' On the other hand,
French law provides that death does not terminate the offer in the event
it had become irrevocable before the offeror's death occurred.15
Once again, no comparative analysis is necessary here because
the rule is the same in Anglo-American jurisdictions following
objective theory. The applicable Restatement section provides: "An
offeree's power of acceptance is terminated when the ... offeror dies
or is deprived of legal capacity to enter into the proposed contract*""'6
The primary rationale for the rule in American law seems to have been
that one "cannot contract with a dead man.""'
Whatever the rationale, one thing that is clear is that the rule is
not consonant with objective theory, but rather is squarely a subjective-
theory based rule. The drafters of the Restatement stated that the rule
is "a relic of the obsolete view that a contract requires a 'meeting of
minds,' and it is out of harmony with the modem doctrine that a
manifestation of assent is effective without regard to actual mental
assent.""'8 The origins of the rule certainly appear to predate the
founding of the American Republic, going back to the French civil law,
112. See BONASSIES ET AL., supra note 4, at 117.
113. Id. at 887.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 116.
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 48 (1981). Section 48 also provides
that the offer is terminated when the offeree dies as well. Id. I will not address this situation
in this Article, because it does not necessarily implicate the same questions of objective
theory and contract formation. Professor Ricks has made a similar conclusion:
Death of offeree cases differ from death of offeror cases both factually and theoretically.
The death of offeree cases are thought to rest on the quite reasonable notion that the offer
is personal to the offeree, and not assignable, so that the death of the offeree leaves no
one left to accept the offer. Of course, difficulties with this rationale exist. The rationale
might over-emphasize the "personalness" of the offer to the offeree. Moreover, an agent
whose agency was coupled with an interest could accept on the offeree's behalf, even
though the offeree had died. This brief discussion proves that the policies animating the
results in cases of death of the offeree differ from those animating cases involving death
of the offeror.
Val D. Ricks, The Death of Offers, 79 IND. L.J. 667, 672-73 n. 14 (2004) (citations omitted).
117. Arthur L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal
Relations, 26 YALE L.J. 169, 198 (1917); see also Oliphant, supra note 17, at 210 ("The courts
say that the reason the offer is terminated by the death of the offerer is obvious. A contract
cannot be made with a dead man.").
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 48 cmt. a.
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and even probably to Roman law."9 Professor Perillo puts it more
bluntly, stating unequivocally that the rule "was an import from the
French subjectivists."'2
2. Mistake and Misunderstanding
Mistake is considered a defect in the consenting process of
contracting in France. Thus, article 1109 of the Civil Code provides
that "[t]here is no valid consent if consent was only given because of
error."'2' And article 1110 of the Code provides a further clarification
of the mistake doctrine in France: "Error is not a ground for nullity of
a convention unless it goes to the very substance of the thing forming
the object of the contract.' 2 2  French doctrine confirms that the
presence of such a serious mistake or error, going to the whole
substance of the subject matter of the contract, completely "vitiate[s]
the will, and contaminate[s] the appearance of consent."'23 Thus, for
instance, Pothier commented that consent was absent if the parties
were jointly in error about the main substance of a sale.22 As an
example of this, Pothier "put forth the case of a party who intends to
sell a house for 9,000 livres while the other understands that the
agreement is for a nine year lease at that price.'2 5 Thus, French law
provides that serious mistakes constitute defects in consent, and this
precludes formation of a contract in the first instance. This is fully
consistent with the subjective theory in France, and the autonomy of
the will.
The area of mistake is, again, one in which very little
comparative analysis need be undertaken, because the law is much the
119. Professor Ricks pinpoints the first mention of the rule in American case law to
the 1830 case, Mactierl Administrators v Frith. Ricks, supra note 116, at 673 (citing
Mactier's Adm'rs v. Frith, 6 Wend. 103 (N.Y. 1830)). Fth's cited the French commentator
Robert Joseph Pothier for the rule. Id (citing ROBERT JOSEPH POTHIER, TRAITt DU CONTRAT
DE VENTE (1806)). Professor Ricks, after an exhaustive tracking down of the origins of the
rule, concludes that "[t]he dying offer rule appears to be a rather textbook example of the
kind of borrowing from Roman, natural law, and medieval philosophy described by James
Gordley." Id. at 674 n.23 (citing JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN
CONTRAcT DOcrRiNE 45-49 (1991)).
120. Perillo, supra note 4, at 464. Professor Perillo discusses an American admiralty
case in 1847 that cited the rule from Pothier. Id at 464-65 (citing The Palo Alto, 18 E Cas.
1062 (D. Me. 1847) (No. 10,700)).
121. This same code section also refers to consent "extorted by force or procured by
fraud." C. cIv. art. 1109 (Fr.), tanslatedinVON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 48, at 1168.
122. Id. art. 1110, tanslatedinVON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 48, at 1168.
123. Perillo, supra note 4, at 469.
124. Id.
125. Id (citing PorHIER, supm note 51, at 20).
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same in Anglo-American jurisdictions. According to the Restatement,
if the two contracting parties make a mutual mistake regarding the
subject matter of the contract, the contract is voidable and thus may be
unenforceable.' 26 It turns out that this is a civil law concept which was
imported into the common law of contracts. An illustrative case which
reveals the heritage of the rule is Iowa Loan & Trust Co. v Schnose,'"
in which the Supreme Court of South Dakota cited the general
statement of the rule regarding mutual mistake, and then remarked:
Such was the civil law. The same rule has been adopted as a part of the
common law, and is based upon the idea that in such cases no contract
has been consummated; that the minds of the parties have never met in
respect to the real subject-matter of the contract.'28
The seventeenth-century French scholar Jean Domat was cited for the
origins of the mistake rule.' 29 Domat's writings, like those of Pothier,
were influential in the drafting of the French Civil Code. The mistake
doctrine in contract law is another example of the common law
importation of French contract law.
The one difference between French law and Anglo-American law
on mistake, which does appear to be a minor implication of the
differences in theory, is that in France a serious mistake in the
contracting process totally vitiates consent. The result is that there is
no contract at all; it never forms in the first place. In the United States,
on the other hand, a mutual mistake will merely make the contract
voidable.'30 This seems to be the result of the differences in subjective
and objective theory. In France, the mistake doctrine under the
subjective theory prevents contract formation because the minds of the
parties have not met. However, in Anglo-American jurisdictions the
mistake does not prevent the objective appearance of mutual assent.
The mistake is a matter of internal cognition, not external appearances.
Therefore, the mistake does not prevent formation of the contract,
though as a practical matter the voidability of the contract at the
adversely affected party's option accomplishes much the same thing.
Therefore, any differences between the two approaches on this point
become practically meaningless, if still rhetorically distinct."'
126. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152 (1981).
127. 103 N.W 22 (S.D. 1905).
128. Id. at 24 (citing Bedell v. Wilder, 26 A. 589 (Vt. 1893)).
129. Id. (citing 1 JEAN DOMAT, LES LOIX CIVILES DANS LEUR ORDRE NATUREL 494 (2d
ed. 1696)).
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152.
131. Though French doctrine is uniform that the basis for mistake is the lack of
consent, one will find more murkiness in common law and objective theory descriptions of
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Reference should also be made here to the Anglo-American
doctrine of "misunderstanding." Though this would appear to be
subsumed within the French conception of "mistake" or "error," it has
developed as a slightly different doctrine in the common law. The
common law misunderstanding doctrine is usually associated with the
famous case of Raffles v Wichelhaus.'32  In Raffles, two parties
contracted for the sale of cotton, which was to arrive on the ship
"Peerless.' ' 33  It turned out there were two different ships called
"Peerless," which arrived at different times of year, and each of the
parties meant a different "Peerless" ship and were unaware of the
other's meaning.'34 The court held there was no contract:
[T]he moment it appears that two ships called the "Peerless" were about
to sail from Bombay there is a latent ambiguity, and parol evidence may
be given for the purpose of shewing that the defendant meant one
"Peerless'" and the plaintiff another. That being so, there was no
consenus [sic] ad idem, and therefore no binding contract.' 35
The doctrine is also set forth intact in the Restatement, which provides
in part: "There is no manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange if
the parties attach materially different meanings to their manifestations
and neither party knows or has reason to know the meaning attached
by the other .... ,36
The misunderstanding rule is completely in accord with a
subjectivist perspective of contract law and with French mistake
doctrine, because it inquires into the subjective, internal understanding
of the consent undertaken by the parties to the contract.' 37 If such
subjective analysis reveals that the parties did not have a "meeting of
the minds'" that is, the same subjective intent, the doctrine provides
that there is no mutual assent and thus no contract in the first place.
the justification for the mistake doctrine. Some commentators base it on a subjectivist
perspective, whereas other common law commentators provide other explanations, including
failure of consideration. See, e.g., Perillo, supra note 4, at 467. Similarly, some
nonsubjective justifications which have historically been offered for the defenses of fraud and
duress include oppression and moral wrong. Id. at 467-69.




136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20(a) (1981). This Restatement
provision also provides that if one of the parties knew or had reason to know of the
"innocent" party's meaning, then there is a contract according to the meaning of the innocent
party. Id § 20(b).
137. See Perillo, supra note 4, at 469 ("American misunderstanding cases agreed with
[the French doctrine of mistake].").
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This is completely in accord with French mistake doctrine.'38 Justice
Holmes once famously (and, some would say, audaciously) attempted
to justify the Raffles holding under the guise of objective theory: "The
true ground of the decision was not that each party meant a different
thing from the other, as is implied ... but that each said a different
thing.' 39 But this observation by Holmes has not stood the test of
time, as most commentators observe that Raffles and the
misunderstanding doctrine is undeniably subjectivist in nature. Grant
Gilmore had the last word on this when he remarked of Holmes'
attempt to objectify Raffles. "The magician who could 'objectify'
Raffles v Wichelaus... could, the need arising, objectify anything.
But why bother?""'4 So, we see that not only is the Anglo-American
concept of mistake very much like the French doctrine (with the
exception of the mere voidability of the consent in common law,
compared to the complete lack of consent in France), but that the
Anglo-American concept of misunderstanding is virtually on all fours
with French doctrine in this area.
3. Rules of Interpretation
One other area in which French contract doctrine can be
compared to common law objective theory rules is in the area of
interpretation of written contracts. Specifically, the rules in France for
interpreting a written contract can be compared to analogous rules in
Anglo-American jurisdictions to determine whether the "subjectivist"
French rules look very different from the more "objectivist" Anglo-
American rules.
In a series of articles of the French Civil Code, rules are set forth
for the interpretation of contracts, many of which look quite familiar to
the common lawyer from an objectivist perspective. However, the first
section in this series of rules in the French Civil Code is article 1156,
which provides the following: "In interpreting agreements, one ought
to seek the common intention of the contracting parties instead of
adhering to the literal meaning of the words."' 4 ' This rule of
construction appears subjectivist in nature, as one would expect when
dealing with French contract law. The provision states that, in the end
for matters of interpretation, what the parties actually (that is,
138. Id.
139. HOLMES, supranote 1, at 242.
140. GILMORE, supra note 27, at 41.
141. C. cmv. art. 1156 (Fr.), translated in VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 48, at
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subjectively/internally) intended is paramount, and the literal (that is,
objective/external) meaning of the contract language is lessened in
importance compared to the supreme goal of divining the actual,
subjective intent of the parties in entering into the contract.
Undoubtedly, in Anglo-American jurisdictions, interpretation is
primarily concerned with the objective meaning of contract language.
However, there are numerous canons of construction at the disposal of
common law judges, and one of them is that "[w]ords and other
conduct are interpreted in the light of all the circumstances, and if the
principal purpose of the parties is ascertainable it is given great
weight."'*42  While this rule is still primarily based upon objective
notions of contract interpretation, it nevertheless makes reference to
the conceptually distinct actual, or subjective, intent of the parties in
making the agreement. In this, it approximates the standard set forth
in article 1156 of the French Civil Code, and thus provides a
commonality between the contract interpretative process in France and
in Anglo-American jurisdictions.
IV CONCLUSION
France has a law of contracts which is dominated (rhetorically, at
least) by subjectivist thinking. Much of the rest of the world has a law
of contracts which is dominated (rhetorically, at least) by objectivist
thinking. However, as demonstrated herein, in practical application on
a rules-based level, the systems converge in ways that one would not
expect from the labels given to the respective systems. Therefore,
though in France a revocation of an offer can theoretically operate
without reference to whether it is ever sent to and received by the
offeree (a rule which is at odds with the common law objective rule
that such revocations must be received in order to be effective), the
outcome in France is tempered by the fact that French doctrine
provides that most offers are irrevocable for a reasonable period and if
prematurely revoked, a delictual obligation is owed to the offeree.
Further, the rules on communication of acceptance, death of offerors,
mistake, and contract interpretation, are all quite similar to each other,
regardless of the system from which they originate. What emerges
from this analysis is a striking similarity in the ultimate effect of rules
in each of the two systems, notwithstanding the different theoretical
underpinnings. France, as it turns out, has components of its contract
law that resemble our "objectivist" common law system. Perhaps even
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(1) (1981).
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more so, our supposedly "objectivist" common law system is not really
purely objectivist in nature, but rather has many subjective
components, many of them obviously borrowed from France.
And, on reflection, this does not turn out to be very surprising. It
has been said that in truth, there is neither an existing pure "objective"
theory of contract, nor a pure "subjective" theory of contract. Rather,
there are elements of both ideas in both systems.'43 Therefore, neither
of the theories can be "carried too far.""'4 As Professor Litvinoff (an
academic of Louisiana civil law who is thus closely aligned to the
French Civil Code) has observed:
The dispute between the subjective will and the declared will theories-
the subjective and the objective approaches to contract-is no longer
realistic. A will that is purely subjective, meaning that it was never
expressed, is irrelevant in the eyes of the law. Only the will that is
declared or manifested, that which materializes in an objective act, may
start the operation of the legal mechanism. Once this occurs, an act of
human conduct has taken place, and every person called to evaluate its
meaning, for instance, a judge, will have to take the act as one single
phenomenon, wherein a certain intention, a subjective element, is
thoroughly blended with a certain utterance, an objective element.
Either of those two elements, although susceptible of being analytically
isolated, is incomplete and insufficient when not taken in the context of
the whole.... The intention illuminates the declaration, in the same
manner as the declaration purports to express the intention.'
French contract law, while filled with the rhetoric of subjective
intent and concern for the "pure" autonomy of wills, in the end comes
close to achieving the same or similar results as its objective theory
brethren around the globe:
The influence of this [autonomy of will] principle on the French Civil
Code and French law in general was such that to this day there is, in
theory, no clear cut distinction between the "real" intention and its
143. See Ricketts v. Pa. R.R., 153 E2d 757, 760-69 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J.,
concurring); see also OwsiA, supra note 67, at 220 ("[N]o legal system can be said to be, in
an all-embracing manner, subjective or objective.").
144. LITvlNoFF, supm note 16, § 135, at 224.
145. Id. § 135, at 225-26 (citing BRUTAU, supra note 16, at 95-112; Karl N. Llewellyn,
What Ptice Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704 (1931)). As Professor
Litvinoff further stated, citing French doctrine:
On the other hand, if it is asserted that the real,--the subjective-will is the true
source of obligations, it is nonetheless necessary to take into account the
declaration, the external manifestation of this will, because the declaration is the
only social, objective fact on which the law can focus.
LrrvINoFn, supra note 16, § 135, at 224 (citing 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, supa note 16, at 109).
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manifestation.... Clearly the necessities of commercial life demanded
that some value should be placed on outward behaviour. It is not
surprising that French writers were compelled to devise a theory which
gives effect to outward behaviour while appearing to adhere to the
principle that only the "real" intention of the parties counts. This theory
maintains that there is no conflict between "real" and apparent intention
inasmuch as outward behaviour is a means whereby the "real" intention
may be deduced. The argument, no doubt, appears artificial for it
ignores a possible clash between real and apparent intention by
assuming that the former must necessarily correspond with the latter.
[But i]n pmctice, the test adopted by French law is not very different
from the objectve test ofEnglish law.'46
The difference between the French subjective system, versus the more
objective system espoused by most of the rest of the world, "is only a
matter of emphasis, since all legal systems have to work with
exteriorized indications of inner psychological elements in order to
appraise and evaluate their legal effects.'
47
It is indeed interesting to note that, though the French law and the
remainder of the objectivist world come at contract law from different
perspectives on contractual intent, the result of actual cases in France
tends to be similar to those achieved in other, more objectivist,
jurisdictions.'48 Therefore, "[u]nderneath these substantial differences
[of contract paradigms], there is ... a lot of pragmatism in applying
principles to concrete cases, and the differences in practice are less
substantial than the different paradigms would tend to predict.'
49
The fact, therefore, that French contract law is subjectivist in its
philosophical origins and underpinnings, whereas Anglo-American
contract law (along with that of most of the rest of the world) is more
pragmatically objective in its philosophy, turns out not to present any
significant impediment to any contemplated participation between the
two legal systems, whether towards future globalization of the law or
otherwise. The different objective and subjective systems "come, in
146. Chloros, supra note 8, at 615-16 (citing PLA/,OL & RIPERT, supr note 44, at 69)
(emphasis added).
147. OWSIA, supra note 67, at 219; see also id at 434 ("[Even in France,] [a]n intention
which is not manifested does not exist in law; and an intention may be treated as not
manifested when it is not manifested to the very one who is required to know of such
intention.").
148. De Ly, supra note 39, at 1848.
149. Id. at 1853; See also OWsIA, supra note 67, at 226 ("It is noteworthy that the two
systems [French and English law], notwithstanding their conceptual differences, come in
certain areas closer to each other by applying the test of 'reasonableness' and taking into
account custom and usage for the interpretation of expressions used.").
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their functioning, strikingly close to each other but through a
labyrinthine maze of theoretically varied routes."5  After the
comparison of the details of rules in the two systems of contract
formation and interpretation, "the impression that remains is that of the
similarity of the attitude of courts to legal problems-an attitude which
transcends historical differences and differences between codified and
case-law systems."'5 ' There is, in other words, much that unites the
French law of contract with that of the rest of the world's contract law
and much less divides it than what may be thought based on the
theoretically distinct underpinnings. The commonalities appear to
transcend the differences, and this is all to the good for future
harmonization of the law.
150. OwsiA, supm note 67, at 569.
151. Chloros, supra note 8, at 620.
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